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FLORIDA V. JARDINES: TRESPASSING ON THE REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
ABSTRACT
The Fourth Amendment affords an individual's home robust protec-
tions from unreasonable searches. After all, the home is a highly private
locus and deserves heightened protections because it is where our most
personal and intimate activities occur. By finding in favor of the individ-
ual in Florida v. Jardines, the United States Supreme Court did not ques-
tion this critical principle; a majority of the Justices concluded that ab-
sent a warrant, the police cannot bring a drug-sniffing dog into a home's
curtilage to search for narcotics. The Jardines Court premised its deci-
sion on property and trespass law, determining that there had been a per
se violation of the Fourth Amendment because the police gathered evi-
dence by physically intruding onto Mr. Jardines' front porch.
However, the majority's sole reliance on property law rendered its
ruling incomplete. As Justice Kagan aptly noted in her concurring opin-
ion, it would have been equally as appropriate to use privacy doctrine to
resolve the case. The majority's purposeful disregard of that critical
analysis leaves important questions unanswered and threatens to dimin-
ish Fourth Amendment protections.
This Comment argues that the Court in Florida v. Jardines should
have included an analysis of privacy doctrine and then discusses some of
the implications that arise from its absence. Although the individual pre-
vailed in Jardines, the majority's narrow focus on property and trespass
law ignored an opportunity to overrule questionable cases and failed to
create broadly applicable precedent. Furthermore, the decision threatens
to diminish the Fourth Amendment protections of individuals who do not
live in single-family detached homes with accompanying property rights.
Lastly, the majority's neglect of a privacy analysis may send the message
that it is unworthy of consideration, and may therefore limit the future
application of critical privacy doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment provides, in part, that citizens have a right
to be free from unreasonable searches.' A Fourth Amendment search
occurs when the government infringes on an individual's reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy2 or "[w]hen 'the [g]overnment obtains information
by physically intruding' on persons, houses, papers, or effects."3 As a
check against abusive government power, a search generally "requires a
warrant that is based on probable cause.",4 If, however, the subject of the
search does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and the gov-
ernment does not commit an intrusion, then no warrant is required and
for the "purposes of the Fourth Amendment ... no search occurs."5 Such
a system naturally creates tension between governmental police power
and individual rights.6 In attempting to balance these often competing
interests, the Supreme Court must walk a fine line that preserves both.7
Florida v. Jardines,8 a 2013 Supreme Court decision, addressed
whether police use of a drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a house
was a search subject to Fourth Amendment protections.9 The majority
I. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Michael Mayer, Keep Your Nose out of My Business-A Look at Dog Sniffs in Public
Places Versus the Home, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2012).
3. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S.
Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012)).
4. Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Use of Trained Dog to Detect Narcotics or Drugs as Unrea-
sonable Search in Violation of Fourth Amendment, 150 A.L.R. FED. 399 (2005).
5. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-42 (1988); Mayer, supra note 2, at 1033.
6. See Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment
Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 584 (1989).
7. Id.
8. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
9. Id.
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concluded that a warrantless sniff search targeting the interior of the
home but conducted from the front porch violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.10 However, the majority utilized property and trespass law instead
of privacy-rights doctrine to reach its decision."l This property-based
approach for deciding a dog-sniff case departed from most modem prec-
edent12 that had relied on privacy doctrine.13 By purposefully neglecting
to address an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, the majority
in Jardines failed to clarify or address the critical privacy concerns pre-
sent when dog sniff searches are aimed at residences. Consequently, the
Jardines decision threatens to diminish Fourth Amendment protections
for those citizens who do not live in single-family detached houses.
This Comment progresses in three parts. Part I addresses prior dog-
sniff and recent Fourth Amendment cases and provides context for the
Jardines decision. Part II summarizes Jardines' facts, procedural history,
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part III explores and cri-
tiques the majority's rationale. It examines whether Jardines effectively
overrules prior dog-sniff and Fourth Amendment search cases, and dis-
cusses Jardines' potential implications for Fourth Amendment privacy
rights. Finally, this Comment posits that although the Court's opinion
resulted in a victory for Mr. Jardines, the majority's sole reliance on
property rights rendered the analysis incomplete and thus threatens to
reduce the Fourth Amendment protections Jardines purportedly safe-
guards.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Modern Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Katz v. United States1
4 trans-
formed Fourth Amendment doctrine and ushered it into the modem era."
Katz departed from a narrow and literal text-based interpretation of
search, defined the term more broadly,'6 and suggested that future analy-
sis proceed "on a case by case basis."'17 Deciding it was no longer limited
to a dictionary definition
8 and an old property and trespass analysis,'
9
10. Id.
11. ld. at 1417.
12. Contra United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951-52 (2012) (providing a recent example
of the Court relying on a property analysis to answer a Fourth Amendment search question).
13. Compare Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 (basing the majority opinion on only a property law
analysis), with Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (using a privacy doctrine analysis to
determine that a sniff search of the outside of a lawfully stopped car did not violate the Fourth
Amendment), and United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (relying on privacy doctrine to
conclude that a dog sniff of luggage did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15. See Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV.
687, 704-05 (2011).
16. Serr, supra note 6, at 588-89, 593.
17. Mayer, supra note 2, at 1033.
18. Serr, supra note 6, at 591.
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the Katz Court liberally construed search to mean any action taken by the
government that breached a citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy.2 °
Justice Stewart, writing for Katz's majority, explained, "[T]he Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places," including "what[ever an indi-
vidual] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the pub-
lic. '21 Using this analysis, the Court determined that the government's
warrantless monitoring of Mr. Katz's conversation in an enclosed tele-
phone booth violated the Fourth Amendment because Mr. Katz sought to
22keep his conversation private. However, the majority also noted that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect activity voluntarily exposed to the
public, even if such activity occurs within a home or private area. 23 Jus-
tice Harlan's concurring opinion helped clarify the Court's ruling.24 Rec-
ognizing the predominantly subjective nature of the majority's new test
(i.e., "whether an individual has knowingly exposed something to the
public or sought to preserve it as private"),25 Justice Harlan established a
twofold requirement for determining if the government has violated an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights.26 "[F]irst[,] that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that . . . is . . . 'reasonable.' 27 This reasonable
expectation of privacy interpretation became the accepted and prevailing
view, and has served as the foundational analysis in almost all modem
Fourth Amendment search cases.28 Katz and Justice Harlan's two-
pronged approach remain, to this day, good law.29
19. Marceau, supra note 15, at 704. Prior to Katz, "the governing principle of Fourth
Amendment law ... was predicated on ... property rights." Id. at 702. The Court's infamous deci-
sion in Olmstead v. United States demonstrated how the Court exclusively protected physical proper-
ty rights. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). The Court ruled in Olmstead
that federal agents' warrantless wiretaps on Mr. Olmstead's home and office telephones did not
violate the Fourth Amendment because the wiretaps were not invasions of physical material inter-
ests. Id. Rather, the Court concluded that phone conversations were intangible and therefore incapa-
ble of suffering physical invasions. Id. The Court has also historically held that there is a per se
violation of the Fourth Amendment when the police trespass to search and obtain information. See,
e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1961). The Court in Silverman found a
violation of the Fourth Amendment not because the police unreasonably invaded Silverman's priva-
cy rights, but because their search "was accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetra-
tion into the premises occupied by [Silverman]." Id. at 509.
20. Mayer, supra note 2, at 1033.
21. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
22. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 ("One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him,
and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world."); Serr, supra note 6, at 592.
23. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); Serr, supra note 6, at 592.
24. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring); Serr, supra note 6, at 592.
25. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Serr, supra note 6, at 592.
26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001) ("In assessing [searches], the
Court has adapted a principle first enunciated in Katz v. United States ...."); California v. Green-
wood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988) (explaining that there would be a Fourth Amendment violation "only
if respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy.., that society accepts as objectively
2014] FLORIDA V. JARDINES: TRESPASSING ONPRIVACY 555
Oliver v. United States,30 a prominent Fourth Amendment case de-
cided in 1984, used Katz's exception for activity voluntarily exposed to
the public's view to limit protection from searches.31 The Court conclud-
ed that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
privately owned but publicly accessible outdoor fields and open lands,
even if the owner of those lands took reasonable precautions to limit the
public's access.32 Fences and no trespassing signs were, according to the
majority, not enough to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.
33
Open fields typically do not serve as a setting for private activities in the
way that a home or office does. Nonetheless, by limiting the definition
and application of what constituted a reasonable expectation of privacy,
the Court weakened Katz's subjective reasonableness tandard.34
Soon after the Oliver decision, the Court rendered another signifi-
cant opinion in California v. Ciraolo,35 which again narrowed the defini-
tion of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy.36 The Court
held that aerial surveillance of curtilage-the home's immediate sur-
rounding land and fixtures-does not infringe on Fourth Amendment
protections.37 The majority employed Oliver's rationale and reasoned
that individuals who expose activities conducted within the curtilage to
public view, even if only from above, forfeit any reasonable expectation
of privacy.38 Whereas Oliver dealt only with open fields far from the
home,39 Ciraolo seized upon the Katz exception for "knowingly ex-
pos[ed] to the public"' 40 to conclude that a visual search aimed at curti-
lage, a traditionally protected area,4 1 was permissible if that area was not
reasonable"); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) ("The touchstone of Fourth Amend-
ment analysis is whether a person has a 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy
.. .' [supported by Katz's] two-part inquiry... " (citation omitted) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 360
(Harlan, J., concurring))); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) ("[T]his Court uniformly
has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its
protection can claim a 'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' that has
been invaded by government action. This inquiry, as Mr. Justice Harlan aptly noted in his Katz
concurrence, normally embraces two discrete questions." (citations omitted)).
29. Serr, supra note 6, at 593. Katz remains good law notwithstanding the fact that Florida v.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013), and United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012), have
resuscitated the old property and trespass approach for examining Fourth Amendment searches.
30. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
31. Id. at 179.
32. Id. at 182.
33. Id.
34. See Serr, supra note 6, at 597-98.
35. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
36. Id. at 213-14.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 215.
39. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984).
40. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
41. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414-15 (2013). Because curtilage has "ancient and
durable roots" and is protected as a "branch[] and appurtenant[]" part of the house, Justice Scalia
concluded that "the officers' investigation took place in a constitutionally protected area." Id. (quot-
ing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 225 (1769)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
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42hidden from public view. Although the police conducted their search in
Ciraolo "in a physically nonintrusive manner" (so that no trespass oc-
curred),43 the Court's upholding of their visual invasion of curtilage
nonetheless resulted in a move away from Katz's robust protections."
After all, it is most likely reasonable for average citizens to expect that
the police will not fly over their houses at low altitude and peer down
into their patios and backyards.45
Unlike Oliver and Ciraolo, two of the Supreme Court's more recent
and illustrative Fourth Amendment cases have found in favor of the indi-
vidual and sustained protection from unreasonably invasive police
searches.46 Kyllo v. United States4 7 accomplished this by applying Katz's
reasonable expectation of privacy test,
48 whereas United States v. Jones49
upheld Fourth Amendment protections by returning to a property analy-
sis.50 In Kyllo, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the use of
"sense-enhancing technology"-in this instance thermal-imaging tech-
nology only available to the government-to gather otherwise private
information from the home constituted a search because it violated the
heightened privacy expectations associated with the home.51 He wrote
that even if used from a public area, intrusive technology capable of
viewing the activity inside a home invaded privacy rights and required a
warrant and probable cause.52 Both Kyllo and Ciraolo occurred without a
physical trespass,53 but Kyllo violated the Fourth Amendment because
the thermal-imager's visual invasion of activity within the home went
beyond Ciraolo's mere visual invasion of activity within the curtilage.54
In Jones, the Court determined that attaching a Global Positioning
System (GPS) tracking device to an automobile without a warrant violat-
ed the Fourth Amendment because a search occurs "within the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment" when "the [g]overnment obtains
information by physically intruding" on persons or their property.55
42. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215.
43. Id. at 213.
44. See Serr, supra note 6, at 611-13.
45. See id.
46. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 40 (2001).
47. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
48. Id. at 40.
49. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
50. Id. at 950. Although Jones was a victory for the individual, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, disconcertingly deviated from the well-established Katz standard. Id. This deviation from
the traditional privacy analysis was repeated again the following year in Justice Scalia's majority
opinion in Florida v. Jardines. See infra Parts I.C, lll.B-C.
51. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 31-33; California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
54. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37-38. Justice Scalia noted, seemingly with disapproval, that the
thermal-imager might disclose the "intimate" detail of"at what hour each night the lady of the house
takes her daily sauna and bath." Id. at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 958 n.3, 964 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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However, Justice Scalia, again writing for the majority, declined to ad-
dress whether such police action violated the Katz reasonable expectation
of privacy standard.56 Instead, he decided the case solely based on tres-
pass law.57 Although he noted that searches "remain[ed] subject to Katz
analysis, '58 Justice Scalia declined to "rush[] forward to resolve [Katz
issues] here" because he felt that a privacy analysis would needlessly
raise "thorny problems" given Jones' particular set of facts.59
However, Justice Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion specifi-
cally noting that in addition to the correctly applied property doctrine, the
Court should have at least considered the Katz standard.60 She questioned
whether the use of a GPS tracking device to monitor the movements of
an individual violated a citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy, and
impliedly answered that it most likely did.6' Yet, notwithstanding Justice
Sotomayor's desire to include a privacy-rights analysis, Jones helped lay
the foundation for the Court's return to a trespass analysis, 62 and servedas important precedent for Justice Scalia's opinion in Jardines.6 3
B. The Supreme Court's Dog-Sniff Cases
Prior to Jardines, the United States Supreme Court had never ad-
dressed the constitutionality of a drug-dog's warrantless sniff search per-
formed within the curtilage of an individual's home. However, in United
States v. Place64 and Illinois v. Caballes65 the Court did address the
Fourth Amendment implications of when police dogs aimed their sniffs
at objects other than a home. In both cases, the Court found that dogs
sniffing for narcotics did not violate the Fourth Amendment.6 6 Place held
that use of a dog to sniff luggage at an airport was not a search because a
sniff was less intrusive than a physical search of the luggage's contents
and because the contents remained private.67 Although the sniff disclosed
the presence of narcotics, such disclosure was limited and "did not con-
stitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
68 Simi-
larly, Caballes concluded that a dog sniff performed in the course of a
traffic stop did not implicate privacy concerns.69 The majority held that a
dog sniff of the exterior of a car legally stopped on a public road did not
56. Id. at 950 (majority opinion).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 953 (emphasis omitted).
59. Id. at 954.
60. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
61. See id. at 956.
62. See id. at 949-50 (majority opinion).
63. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414, 1417 (2013).
64. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
65. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
66. Id. at 409-10; Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
67. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
68. Id.
69. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408-09.
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breach an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.7 The Court in
Place explained that reasonable expectations of privacy may be tied to
"the manner in which the information is obtained."71 Because in both
cases the search occurred in a public area and did not constitute a physi-
cal intrusion (i.e., a trespass), the Court concluded that each search was
reasonable and "[did] not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable
infringement.
'" 72
C. Lower Courts' Treatment of Dog Sniffs Targeting Dwellings
Several of the nation's lower courts have considered whether the
Fourth Amendment protects against dog sniffs aimed at dwellings when
the sniffs are conducted from the hallways and common spaces of hotels,
apartments, and other multi-unit residences.73 Although the United States
Supreme Court has upheld certain Fourth Amendment protections for
those who do not own their residences,74 the lower courts' near unani-
mous conclusions have been that neither property law nor privacy rights
protect residents living in multi-unit dwellings from dog sniff searches
75targeting their home but conducted from hallways or common areas.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, perhaps
unsurprisingly, did not afford an individual staying in a hotel room the
same heightened privacy protections granted to someone residing in a
single-family detached house.76 Although people renting hotel rooms are
entitled to privacy within the room,77 the Eighth Circuit concluded that
an expectation of privacy does not extend to the common hallway out-
side the room because it is open to the public and "traversed by many
people.78 As a result, a drug-sniffing dog patrolling the hallway and
70. Id
71. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
72. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1015-16 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
canine's drug-sniff from the publicly accessible hallway of an apartment building was not an unrea-
sonable violation of privacy expectations); United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1124 (8th Cir.
1997) (holding that a drug-dog sniffing into rooms from a hotel corridor did not violate Fourth
Amendment privacy rights); Fitzgerald v. State, 864 A.2d 1006, 1017-18 (Md. 2004) (holding that a
drug-dog's sniff of the exterior of an apartment was not a search because the police and dog were
lawfully located in the apartment building's common areas).
74. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958) (holding that warrantless entry
into an apartment is a Fourth Amendment violation); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453,
456 (1948) (holding that a tenant in a rooming house had his Fourth Amendment rights violated
when the police entered his room without a warrant).
75. See supra note 73; contra United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that a drug-dog sniffing from the hallway into an apartment violated the Fourth Amendment
because it infringed on the dweller's heightened expectation of privacy attached to his place of
residence).
76. See Roby, 122 F.3d at 124.
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detecting odors emanating from the rooms "does not contravene the
79Fourth Amendment" even though the dog is sniffing into private areas.
Additionally, state and federal courts, with rare exception, do not af-
ford apartment dwellers the same level of Fourth Amendment protection
against dog sniffs80 as the Supreme Court now affords residents of sin-
gle-family houses.81 Residents of apartment buildings do not have prop-
erty rights in the hallways-the closest thing to curtilage in a multi-unit
dwelling. Thus, unlike individuals living in detached single-family hous-
es, apartment dwellers cannot grant or revoke licenses82 to people or po-
lice dogs approaching their front doors.83 Courts have also determined
that, similar to hotel corridors, the quasi-public nature of hallways and
common areas in apartment buildings diminishes or even eliminates a
resident's reasonable expectation of privacy in those locations.84 The
rationale is that public access to hallways and common areas, even if
only to a limited extent, necessarily reduces the resident's privacy expec-
tation because anyone could be passing through.85 The court in Fitzger-
ald v. State86 clearly articulated that because "the apartment building's
common area and hallways were accessible to the public," the dog sniff
was not a search because the police were not trespassing or violating
privacy rights.87 United States v. Scott88 similarly held that a sniff search
of an apartment's front door was legal because the police and drug-
sniffing dog were lawfully present in the hallway outside of the apart-
ment and engaged in the course of "[o]fficial conduct that [did] not
'compromise any legitimate interest in privacy."' 89
79. Id.
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text; Leslie A. Lunney Has the Fourth Amendment
Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home,
88 OR. L. REV. 829, 831 (2009) (noting that the Second Circuit is the only federal circuit court to
conclude that a dog sniff of a private residence is a search).
81. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417-18 (2013).
82. Historically, residents of detached single-family houses have had the power to grant or
revoke licenses to others approaching their home, thereby controlling who can access their property.
See id. at 1415. "A license may be implied from the habits of the country," McKee v. Gratz, 260
U.S. 127, 136 (1922) (citing Marsh v. Colby, 39 Mich. 626, 627 (1878)), but there also exists an
"implicit license typically permit[ting] the visitor to approach the home." Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at
1415.
83. See United States v. Cephas, 254 F.3d 488, 494 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Concep-
cion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 89, 92 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing United States v.
Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32 (1 st Cir. 1998)) ("It is now beyond cavil in this circuit that a tenant lacks a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building."); Mayer, supra
note 2, at 1043.
85. See Mayer, supra note 2, at 1043-44.
86. 864 A.2d 1006 (Md. 2004).
87. Id. at 1017-18.
88. 610 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2010).
89. Id. at 1016 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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The only potential caveat in such cases, explained by the Sixth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Heath,90 is that a heightened expectation of priva-
cy may exist when apartment buildings are locked and only accessible to
tenants.9' Nonetheless, the expectation of privacy may be diminished if
even just one resident of the building unlocks the doors and permits the
police to enter.92 If that occurs, the police presence becomes lawful, and
they may search hallways and common areas and use dogs to sniff for
drugs.93
II. FLORIDA V. JARDINES
A. Facts
On November 3, 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-
Dade Police Department received an unverified tip that Joelis Jardines
was cultivating marijuana in his home.94 One month later, Detective Ped-
raja and Detective Bartelt investigated the claim.95 Franky, a drug-
sniffing dog, accompanied Detectives Bartelt and Pedraja as they staked
out Mr. Jardines' home.96 After observing the home for fifteen minutes
and not seeing any signs of activity, Detectives Pedraja and Bartelt,
along with Franky, approached Mr. Jardines' house.97 As Franky neared
the residence he became excited, having detected one of the odors he was
trained to recognize.98 Seeing Franky agitated, Detective Pedraja "stood
back," and Detective Bartelt gave Franky the full benefit of the six-foot
leash so that the dog could freely ascertain the source of the odor.99
Franky worked his way up onto Mr. Jardines' porch, ultimately settling
at the base of the home's front door and signaling that this was the odor's
origin and strongest point.1°° Detective Bartelt and Franky then retreated,
and Bartelt notified Pedraja that Franky had positively indicated that
narcotics were present. °0
Based on Franky's discovery, Detective Pedraja quickly moved for
and obtained a warrant to search Mr. Jardines' residence where, upon
execution, the police discovered marijuana plants growing inside. 102 The
90. 259 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2001).
91. Id. at 534.
92. See United States v. Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1193 (D. Colo. 2008).
93. See id.
94. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 37 (Fla. 2011), rev'g 9 So. 3d I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008),
aff'd, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Mr. Jardines argued at his trial that the use of a drug-sniffing dog
positioned on his front porch was an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment.104 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the
matter,10 5 ruled in favor of Mr. Jardines, and granted his motion to sup-
press the discovery of the marijuana plants.1' 6 The State appealed, and
the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed the suppression rul-
ing. 1°7 The court concluded that no illegal search occurred because a dog
sniff did not require a warrant, the police had probable cause, and the
discovery of the marijuana "was inevitable."'0 8 The Florida Supreme
Court accepted a petition for discretionary review and overruled the
Third District Court of Appeal's decision.10 9 The Florida Supreme Court
held that the use of Franky to investigate Mr. Jardines' house was a
Fourth Amendment search unsupported by probable cause,"0 reasoning
that the tip that Mr. Jardines was growing marijuana was unverified, un-
corroborated, and from an unknown individual."' It therefore concluded
that the warrant obtained in light of Franky's sniff search was invalid.
112
Furthermore, Florida's Supreme Court determined that the "'sniff test'
... constitute[d] an intrusive procedure" and was a "'search' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment."' 3 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari, taking up the question of whether the officers'
and dog's behavior was a Fourth Amendment search. 114
C. Majority Opinion
In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court affirmed the
Florida Supreme Court, concluding that police use of a narcotics sniffing
dog "to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings" constituted
a Fourth Amendment search."15 In his opinion, joined by Justices Thom-
as, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice Scalia focused his analysis
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 38 (Fla. 2011), rev'g 9 So. 3d I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008),
aff'd, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
106. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1413.
107. Id.
108. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 38 (quoting State v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008)).
109. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1413.
110. Id.
111. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 54-55.
112. Id. at 55.
113. Id. at 49.
114. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
115. Id. at 1417-18.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
on property rights, not privacy rights.'l 6 He found that a trespass oc-
curred because the police "physically intrud[ed] on Jardines' property to
gather evidence" without Mr. Jardines' consent.117 Quoting United States
v. Jones, Justice Scalia concluded that because any information gathered
by warrantless physical intrusion was a per se violation of the Fourth
Amendment, Mr. Jardines had undoubtedly been the victim of an illegal
search. 
1 18
The majority found that an individual's right "to retreat into his own
home and ... be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion" stood
at the "very core" of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee 1 9 that the "right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."'' 20 The
Court recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to all intru-
sions onto personal property,1 21 but concluded that it does protect against
physical invasions of "[t]he area 'immediately surrounding and associat-
ed with the home"' (i.e., the curtilage).
22
Because curtilage includes the front porch, the Court considered
whether the police committed "an unlicensed physical intrusion."1 23 The
majority decided that the police did commit such an intrusion because
they entered Mr. Jardines' porch without his consent and engaged in
something for which "[t]here [was] no customary invitation."' 24 Accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, the implicit license that homeowners grant to visi-
tors such as "Girl Scouts [or] trick-or-treaters" does not extend to trained
narcotics dogs fishing for evidence. 125 He said that no customary license
grants the police an invitation "to explore the area around the home in
hopes of discovering incriminating evidence.,126 Therefore, the police
and drug-dog exceeded the scope of their license1 27 and unlawfully in-
truded onto Mr. Jardines' property. 28 The Court concluded that an illegal
search occurred because the government obtained information by intrud-
ing into a constitutionally protected area without permission.129 Acquir-
116. Id. at 1414, 1417.
117. Id. at 1417.
118. Id. at 1414 (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012)).
119. Id. at 1412 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
120. Id. at 1414 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924)).
122. Id. at 1412, 1414 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
123. Id. at 1415.
124. Id. at 1415-16.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1416.
127. Id. at 1415-16. Justice Scalia noted that the police are within the scope of their license if
they merely approach the home, but that action above and beyond what "any private citizen might
do" (such as bringing a dog onto your porch to sniff for drugs) exceeds the scope of their implied
license because such action breaches "background social norms." Id. (quoting Kentucky v. King,
131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
128. Id at 1416.
129. Id. at 1414.
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ing information by such means automatically triggers property and tres-
pass-based Fourth Amendment protections.' Consequently, Justice
Scalia concluded that there was no need to examine whether the police
violated Mr. Jardines' privacy rights under Katz v. United States.131
D. Concurring Opinion
Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, wrote to
emphasize that the police violated both Mr. Jardines' property rights and
his privacy rights. 32 Mr. "Jardines' home was his property," but "it was
also his most intimate and familiar space" and was protected by height-
ened privacy expectations.33 The concurring opinion determined that the
police infringed on Mr. Jardines' privacy because they employed "a su-
per-sensitive instrument," i.e., Franky's nose, to detect what was not
otherwise noticeable.134 Justice Kagan concluded that this violated the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" standard articulated in Katz because
the police (literally) "nos[ed] into intimacies [Mr. Jardines] sensibly
thought [were] protected from disclosure[.]',135 Additionally, the concur-
ring opinion reasoned that the use of such technology to see (or in this
case to smell) into Mr. Jardines' intimate and private space clearly con-
stituted an invasion of privacy consistent with the decision in Kyllo v.
United States. 136 Justice Kagan likened Franky's advanced olfactory abil-
ities to Kyllo's thermal-imaging device.137 She said that drug-sniffing
dogs, like advanced thermal-imagers, are technologically advanced in-
struments not available to the public.138 Therefore, their use to examine a
home without a warrant amounts to an invasion of privacy.139 Justice
Kagan summed up her concurring opinion by reemphasizing that an in-
clusion of the Katz privacy analysis strengthened the majority's property
approach and easily resolved the case.'40
E. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
Kennedy and Breyer, contended that the police neither violated Mr.
Jardines' property rights by approaching his front door, nor his privacy
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1417.
132. Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 1419.
134. Id. at 1418; see Kyllo v. United States, 533 US. 27, 34-35, 40 (2001). With this descrip-
tion of Franky's nose and what it could detect, Justice Kagan is no doubt drawing an analogy to the
thermal-imager from Kyllo. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
135. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
136. Id. at 1418-19.
137. Id. at 1419.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1420.
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rights by using a dog to sniff for narcotics.14 1 Justice Alito found no evi-
dence of trespass because he claimed the police officers' behavior did
not deviate from either the implied license to approach a home or Ken-
tucky v. King's 42 "knock and talk" rule.143 Justice Alito noted that the
rule from King granted police officers an implied license to approach
homes.'4 He also noted that, according to King, the police do not engage
in a search when they walk up to front doors, even if they approach sole-
ly to gather evidence. 145 The dissenting opinion contended therefore that
Detective Bartelt and Franky "did not exceed the scope of the license to
approach" because they did not deviate from the license's established
"spatial and temporal limits." 46 By approaching Mr. Jardines' home
during the day, staying on the front yard's paved walkway, and only re-
maining on the property for a few minutes, the dissenting opinion found
that the police did not do anything forbidden under King's knock and talk
rule or limited by the common law license to approach.147 Justice Alito
accused the majority of distorting the law to comport with its desired
result and claimed that Anglo-American common law lacked any support
whatsoever for their contentions. 1
48
The dissent also dismissed Justice Kagan's claim that Franky was a
unique technology whose use intruded on privacy rights.149 Justice Alito
claimed that law enforcement has been using dogs and their sense of
smell for centuries. 150 He asserted that such use in no way violated Mr.
Jardines' reasonable xpectation of privacy because a reasonable person
would be aware that the police use drug-sniffing dogs, and would assume
that odors may emanate from a dwelling and spread to areas freely acces-
sible to the public.'5' Thus, Justice Alito found no infringement on rea-




The Supreme Court decided Florida v. Jardines by determining that
the police dog's sniff search on the front porch-an area well within es-
tablished curtilage-constituted a trespass under property law and there-
fore an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.53 Although
141. Id. at 1426 (Alito, J., dissenting).
142. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (201 I).
143. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1423;King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862.
144. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1423.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1422-23.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1420-21.
149. Id. at 1425.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1426.
153. See id. at 1414-16 (majority opinion).
[Vol. 9 1:2
2014] FLORIDA V. JARDINES: TRESPASSING ON PRIVACY 565
Jardines' outcome differed from many of the Court's other dog-sniff
cases, it did not overrule those previous holdings.154 Despite Jardines
finding in favor of the individual,155 its easily distinguishable facts and
distinct doctrinal approach ensure the continued viability of cases like
Place, Caballes, and Scott.1 56 Although Justice Kagan's analysis, if
adopted by the majority, would not have upset Place or Caballes, its
emphasis on privacy doctrine would have provided a broader examina-
tion of critical Fourth Amendment issues and probably overturned cases
like Scott. Therefore, in order to provide the most robust Fourth
Amendment search protections, the majority should have adopted Justice
Kagan's approach and supplemented its property analysis with privacy
considerations. Instead, the majority's decision to focus solely on proper-
ty and trespass law raises concerns with the future application of privacy
rights in Fourth Amendment cases. Jardines' purposeful neglect of the
Katz standard leaves unanswered critical questions concerning what level
of privacy an individual can expect in his or her dwelling and jeopardizes
the Fourth Amendment rights of many of this country's citizens. Alt-
hough the Court's decision was technically a victory for Mr. Jardines,
Jardines fails to overturn questionable prior decisions or apply and en-
sure that the longstanding privacy doctrine maintains its importance in
Fourth Amendment analysis.
A. Jardines Does Not Overrule Place, Caballes, Scott, or Other Similar
Dog-Sniff Cases
Contrary to Illinois v. Caballes and United States v. Scott, Florida v.
Jardines found in favor of the individual claiming a Fourth Amendment
violation.1 57 Jardines achieved this result by focusing on the fact that the
search occurred in a constitutionally protected location and by employing
property law instead of privacy doctrine.158 However, Jardines did not
invalidate the privacy approach taken by Place, Caballes, and Scott, nor
did it overrule their holdings.5 9 Jardines is therefore best understood as a
154. First, Jardines makes no mention in its opinion about overruling prior case law. Second,
the facts and situation in Jardines are not analogous to the facts from other cases because those cases
did not concern privately owned homes surrounded by curtilage. See, e.g., United States v. Scott,
610 F.3d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010) (concerning rented apartments without curtilage or property
rights).
155. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417-18 (concluding that the police engaged in an illegal
search and affirming Florida's Supreme Court ruling in favor of Mr. Jardines).
156. Compare Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414-15 (examining curtilage rights and private homes),
with Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406-09 (2005) (looking at automobiles on public roads),
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 697-700 (1983) (involving luggage in airports), and Scott, 610
F.3d at 1012, 1016 (concerning apartments where the residents are not protected by property rights).
157. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409; Scott, 610 F.3d at 1018. The Court in Place ruled in favor
of the individual, but absent an improper seizure-"the seizure of respondent's luggage was unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment"--would not have done so. Place, 462 U.S. at 707, 710
("Therefore, we conclude that.., exposure ofrespondent's luggage ... to a trained canine [] did not
constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
158. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417-18.
159. Id. at 1414.
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location-specific refinement of the dog-sniff doctrine that Place and re-
lated cases advanced.
Place held that a warrantless dog sniff did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.60 The Court, using Katz's reasonable expectation of priva-
cy test, determined that the dog sniff in question was not an unreasonable
invasion of privacy because it occurred in the very public realm of an
airport and because the sniff search did not expose the private contents of
the suitcase for public display.161 Jardines held that a dog sniff was un-
constitutional, but the critical difference between the two cases is that in
Jardines the sniff occurred within the home's curtilage boundaries and
violated property rights.162 The majority in Jardines determined that un-
like a dog sniff of a suitcase in a public airport, which implicated privacy
doctrine, a sniff search occurring within the boundaries of curtilage im-
plicated property law and activated Fourth Amendment protections.1
63
However, Jardines' use of different doctrinal analysis does not void the
constitutionality of dog sniffs aimed at luggage or reverse Place's hold-
ing. Rather, it highlights the underlying factual differences between the
two cases and demonstrates the different possible outcomes when using
property law and privacy-rights analysis.
The Court in Caballes found that police use of a narcotics dog did
not violate Fourth Amendment protections when the dog sniffed the exte-
rior of an automobile that had been lawfully pulled over on a public
road. 64 The public and exposed location was critical to the Court's con-
clusion, as was the fact that the dog sniff only revealed the presence of
contraband.1 65 Because open roads do not hide a vehicle or its occupant,
and because there is no right to possess contraband, the Court concluded
that a dog sniff of the exterior of a car did not violate the driver's reason-
able expectation of privacy.166 Caballes, like Place, relied on privacy
doctrine and remains good law because its facts do not align with
Jardines' or allow for application of a similar property analysis. 1
67
Jardines does not upset the Supreme Court's general dog-sniff ju-
risprudence, epitomized by Place and Caballes, nor does it upset the
lower courts' decisions about dog sniffs aimed at multi-unit dwellings.68
This is because the Court in Jardines emphasized location and focused
on the fact that the police trespassed and illegally searched for drugs
from within the curtilage.169 The facts from the prior apartment cases are
160. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
161. Id. at 706-07.
162. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
163. Id. at 1414-16.
164. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005).
165. Id. at 409-10.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 408-09.
168. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010).
169. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415-16(2013).
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not analogous; the courts have held that the Fourth Amendment does not
protect hallways and common areas of multi-unit residences, and that the
police do not trespass or exceed the scope of their license to approach
when they enter those areas.170 Not only do apartments and similar dwell-
ings lack protection from trespass, but also their openness and close
proximity diminish residents' privacy expectations both inside the dwell-
ing and in hallways and common areas outside.71 Jardines, with its dif-
ferent fact pattern, does not overrule prior apartment cases or question
their holdings. 72 However, Jardines did present the Court with an oppor-
tunity to reevaluate the dubious holdings and privacy analyses of those
older cases. The fact that the Court did not seize the opportunity to do so
is a serious oversight and shortcoming that leaves the Jardines ruling
lacking in critical analysis.
B. The Majority's Analysis Is Insufficiently Developed
Justice Scalia wrote that his use of trespass law "keeps easy cases
easy."173 This sentiment might explain why the majority's opinion is
oversimplified and under-inclusive. Trespass law is only one way to de-
cide Fourth Amendment cases174 and its tenets are often debatable.75
Jardines' facts may arguably lend themselves to a straightforward,
"baseline[,] ... [and] easy"176 application of trespass law, but contrary to
the majority's contention, the Court should have also engaged in a priva-
cy analysis.77 Privacy rights are crucial to a complete Fourth Amend-
ment analysis.1 78 Especially because the home is an area of heightened
privacy protections,79 the majority should have supplemented its proper-
ty law analysis with an examination of privacy expectations. Justice
Scalia readily admits that "[a]t the Amendment's 'very core' stands 'the
right ... to retreat into [your] own home and there be free from unrea-
sonable governmental intrusion."'1 80 To be free from intrusion is precise-
ly what it means to have privacy, and therefore the home-the most
170. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 154, 156 and accompanying text.
173. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
174. Id. at 1414. Justice Scalia noted that property and trespass law is one way-but not the
only way-to address Fourth Amendment violations. Id. He acknowledged that the Katz privacy
standard "add[s] to the baseline" of the Fourth Amendment's protections. Id.
175. See, e.g., id. at 1420-24 (Alito, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 1417 (majority opinion).
177. Id. ("[W]e need not decide whether the officers[] ... violated [Mr. Jardines'] expectation
of privacy under Katz.").
178. See Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 649 (Cal. 1994) ("[T]he right to
privacy [is] 'an important American heritage and essential to the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the ... Fourth ... Amendment[] to the U.S. Constitution."'); see supra note 28 and accompanying
text.
179. Serr, supra note 6, at 593.
180. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961)).
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highly private locus'8'-is deserving of the greatest Fourth Amendment
protections and a thorough application of privacy doctrine.'82 The majori-
ty's purposeful disregard of Katz and privacy renders its opinion incom-
plete and fails to extend search protections to all citizens. Had the ma-
jority employed a privacy analysis, the Court could have ensured equal
application of the Fourth Amendment for all citizens by reasserting that
the home, no matter what its physical or structural characteristics, re-
ceives the greatest Fourth Amendment protections.
Justice Kagan, noting that privacy interests would have just as easi-
ly decided this case, filled the majority's void.183 She argued that the
Miami-Dade Police Department violated Mr. Jardines' reasonable expec-
tation of privacy when it used a trained narcotics dog to "reveal within
the confines of a home what they could not otherwise" have observed.
84
To reach this conclusion, Justice Kagan appropriately based her privacy
analysis off the Court's decision in Kyllo. 85 She accurately compared
Jardines' narcotic-sniffing dog to Kyllo's thermal-imager, noting that
drug-sniffing dogs are highly specialized pieces of equipment unavaila-
ble to the public. 186 The concurring opinion concluded that the use of
such technology to smell into an individual's home violated a reasonable
expectation of privacy just like the use of a thermal-imager to see into
the home violated reasonable privacy expectations. 1
87
Additionally, Justice Kagan's opinion impliedly acknowledged the
important distinction between the target of a search and the location of a
search.88 Kyllo explained that the search's target ought to be examined
because it may have privacy rights associated with it.' 89 Contrarily, Jones
held that it was only necessary to determine if a trespass occurred at the
search's location, and concluded that there was no need to examine
whether the search's target was entitled to a reasonable expectation of
privacy.19° Justice Kagan's concurring opinion in Jardines rightly ap-
plied Kyllo's approach. It considered the search's target and explained
that there is the presumption that when the police target a residence-or
even "the entrance to [a dwelling]"-privacy rights apply and the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment are in full force.' 9 1 By adopting Kyllo's
approach and rationale, Justice Kagan realized and emphasized the im-
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).




188. Seeid. at 1418.
189. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34, 40 (2001).
190. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012).
191. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
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portance of including a privacy-rights analysis when deciding Fourth
Amendment search cases.192
Jardines' majority should have examined the Katz doctrine and
Kyllo's privacy analysis because both are relevant when examining
Fourth Amendment protections for the home. Thankfully, Justice Ka-
gan's concurring opinion picked up where the majority left off, managed
to provide a straightforward application of privacy doctrine, and made
"an 'easy cas[e] easy' twice over."' 9 3 Although the majority's property
and trespass approach upheld Fourth Amendment rights, the holding is
incomplete because of the failure to adequately address all of the critical
elements of a Fourth Amendment case. As a result, the majority runs the
risk that Jardines will eventually come to signify that the privacy analy-
sis is of secondary importance or that its examination is only required if
the trespass standard is not met. 194
C. The Majority's Holding Is Problematic Because It Raises Practical
and Social Concerns and Potentially Limits Critical Constitutional
Protections
Jardines held that the police conducted an illegal search, but the
opinion does not strengthen Fourth Amendment protections. The majori-
ty's decision to pursue only a property and trespass analysis threatens to
diminish Katz's longstanding and critical privacy doctrine. As a result,
Justice Scalia may have taken an "easy"1 95 case and "produce[d] inferior
law." 96 By refusing to examine whether Mr. Jardines had a reasonable
expectation of privacy at the doorstep of his home, the Court created two
problems. First, its narrow focus on property law produced uncertainty
and practical problems with future application of Fourth Amendment
protections for residences. Second, by failing to examine privacy rights
and address the implications and holdings of the lower courts' prior dog-
sniff cases, the Court perpetuated a troubling application of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that fails to apply constitutional protections
equally to all individuals.
1. Practical Questions Are Left Unanswered
The majority's singular focus on property and trespass law created a
narrow holding that will be difficult to apply in future cases when dog
sniffs are aimed at a home. For example, what if, instead of Franky sniff-
ing from Mr. Jardines' front porch, he was an extraordinarily talented
192. Id. at 1419-20.
193. Id. at 1420 (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 1417 (majority opinion)).
194. In fact, Jardines is the second Supreme Court decision in as many years to ignore a priva-
cy analysis in favor of the old property and trespass standard. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
949 (2012), is the other case decided using property rights. Therefore, Jardines could be interpreted
as reinforcing this trend.
195. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 (majority opinion).
196. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 884 (2006).
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drug-sniffing dog and could detect odors from the street? Or, what if
technology advances to the point where it becomes possible to conduct
drug searches of homes from public areas? Kyllo might provide some
guidance,'97 but Place and Caballes might contravene Kyllo.198 Because
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband,'99 and be-
cause a drug-dog's sniff search would only reveal drugs, those questions
become complicated. Regardless of what their answers might be, and
although the home would still be the target of the search, the change in
location from where the police conduct the search would render
Jardines' narrow focus on property and trespass law incapable of provid-
ing answers. Justice Kagan's privacy-rights framework would be much
better suited to tackling those complex questions and is certainly easier
to apply when the facts from other cases do not exactly align with those
from Jardines.2°
Another problem with the majority's opinion is that its analysis only
201relied on the physical characteristics of Mr. Jardines' property. Mr.
Jardines was only afforded Fourth Amendment protection in this case
because he lived in a single-family detached house with a front porch and
a surrounding yard.20 2 Consequently, the majority's fact-specific analysis
cannot answer what would have happened had Mr. Jardines been living
in an apartment when the police brought a drug-dog to his front door.
Certainly a curtilage analysis would be inapplicable, and a trespass anal-
ysis would fail to address the Fourth Amendment's critical privacy con-
203cerns and seemingly guarantee victory for the state. However, a priva-
cy analysis could resolve whether the police officers' search violated the
Fourth Amendment. Yet, the majority in Jardines purposely avoided
discussing privacy rights.204 Would a dog sniff search of an apartment
from outside its door be permissible? Many older cases hold that it would
be.20 5 But, even though Jardines emphasized a residence's special pro-
tected status,2°6 the majority's analysis cannot answer whether apart-
ments-despite also being places of residence-would be afforded simi-
lar heightened protections.
197. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). Kyllo's facts are similar to that hypo-
thetical, and the Court held that a thermal-imager used from a public road to peer into a home was an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy rights. Id. at 40.
198. Both cases held that sniffs by drug-dogs in public areas did not violate reasonable expec-
tations of privacy because they did not reveal intimate details otherwise hidden from public view.
See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
199. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.
200. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418-20 (Kagan, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 1414 (majority opinion).
202. Id.
203. See supra note 73.
204. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 (noting that "we need not decide ... expectation of priva-
cy.... ").
205. See supra note 73.
206. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414-15.
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Jardines' narrow and fact-specific decision is therefore only rele-
vant to cases with nearly identical facts and does not adequately advance
Fourth Amendment interpretation. As a result, it produces no broadly
applicable rule and provides only limited guidance. Broader holdings and
definitions of search are generally better because they are "fairer, more
regular, [and] more constitutionally reasonable . . . [and because they]
reduce[] the opportunities for official arbitrariness, discretion, and dis-
crimination.'20 7 By failing to provide a broadly applicable interpretation
of Fourth Amendment rights for when dog sniffs are aimed at dwellings,
Jardines leaves lower courts largely without guidance when faced with
similar but not easily comparable cases.
2. Social and Constitutional Concerns
The second major problem with the majority's analysis is that it did
not adequately address the privacy rights inherent to all places of resi-
dence208 or consider their impact on a dwelling regardless of its physical
or economic nature. This lack of a privacy analysis allows for the perpet-
uation of troubling constitutional inequalities and threatens to limit ap-
plication of Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy standard.
Although the majority recognized that at the "very core" of the
Fourth Amendment stands an individual's right to retreat into the home
and "there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion,"2°9 its
opinion did not extend that protection to all citizens. Under Justice Scal-
ia's property analysis, only citizens living in places with curtilage-i.e.,
most privately owned single-family homes-are afforded Fourth
Amendment protection from police dogs sniffing for narcotics.210 Unlike
Kyllo, which was decided based on the target of the search,2" the Court
relied on the location of the search in Jardines.21 2 Justice Scalia reasoned
that the police violated Mr. Jardines' Fourth Amendment rights because
they searched from a specific location-his front porch.21 3 However, the
Court should have decided Jardines by examining the target of the
207. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 809
(1994).
208. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001); United States v. Thomas, 757
F.2d 1359, 1366 (2d Cir. 1985).
209. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. Id. at 1416.
211. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. Kyllo was decided based on the target of the search. Id. Because
the target was the home, and the Fourth Amendment affords the greatest protection to the home, the
Court deemed the search illegal. Id. Because the police did not commit a trespass, the search's loca-
tion was irrelevant, and it would not have made any difference had the police used the thermal-
imager from an airplane, satellite, or the neighbor's house next door. Id.
212. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416-17.
213. Id. at 1417 ("Thus, we need not decide whether the officers' investigation of Jardines'
home violated his expectation of privacy under Katz.... That the officers learned what they learned
only by physically intruding on Jardines' property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a
search occurred.").
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search, which is what Justice Kagan's concurring opinion advocated.
That is, the Court should have decided the case based on the fact that the
police searched Mr. Jardines' home.
Justice Scalia's narrow focus on location instead of target risks di-
minishing the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who do not live in
stand-alone houses.2 14 When the police aim searches at the home, the
courts often determine the applicability of Fourth Amendment protec-
tions by looking at the dwelling's physical characteristics.2 5 Because of
this, structure becomes a decisive factor in the level of protection afford-
ed to individuals, and Fourth Amendment rights become highly correlat-
ed to economic class.216 This results in an application of the Fourth
Amendment that favors those who have the financial ability to afford
private homes.21 7 This, in turn, offers wealthier citizens greater protection
than poorer citizens.2 18 "Privacy follows space . . . people with money
have more space than people without" and therefore are granted the
heightened privacy protections that go along with their additional space
and curtilage.21 9 Poorer and younger people generally are unable to af-
ford private homes and more often live in apartments.22 As a result, they
do not have curtilage or property rights and the Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit the police from conducting searches at their front doors.22
This ensuing disparity in Fourth Amendment protections is cause
for concern. The Fourth Amendment should not "protect[] only those
persons who can afford to live in a single-family residence with no sur-
rounding common space.222 Instead, the Fourth Amendment must pro-
tect all people from unwarranted governmental intrusion. 223 Failure to
provide such protection would grant greater Fourth Amendment protec-
tions to those "who are more financially successful,' 224 those who are
older, those with a larger family, those who are less transient, and those
who do not live in a high-density urban environment. The text of the
Fourth Amendment does not differentiate between property owners and
renters or between single-family homes and multi-unit dwellings; it af-
fords all people the same level of protection from governmental intru-
sion.225 Jardines, by failing to focus on the target of the search-thehome-and instead basing its ruling on the location of the search-the
214. See Mayer, supra note 2, at 1045.
215. See supra note 73.
216. Mayer, supra note 2, at 1045.
217. Id.
218. William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1265, 1266 (1999).
219. Id. at 1270.
220. Id.
221. See supra note 73.
222. United States v. Roby, 122 F.3d 1120, 1127 (8th Cir. 1997) (Heaney, J., dissenting).
223. Mayer, supra note 2, at 1045.
224. id.
225. Id; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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curtilage-improperly shifts the focus of Fourth Amendment protections
and threatens to greatly diminish the cherished, heightened, and long-
established privacy rights that accompany homes.226 At least in this and
similar contexts, the target of the search is more important than the loca-
tion from which it occurs. After all, the Fourth Amendment does not
protect places; it protects people and objects.227
Jardines' failure to address privacy concerns and extend full Fourth
Amendment protections to all citizens regardless of what type of home
they live in has serious constitutional ramifications. It also creates bad
law and propagates the unfortunate precedent of limiting Fourth
Amendment privacy analysis. Although fluidity and flux often character-
ize the Fourth Amendment,228 Jardines strays too far by totally neglect-
ing privacy analysis. Trespass law, while certainly a traditional and valid
means of determining whether an illegal search has occurred, "need[s] to
be supplemented to deal with" the privacy concerns brought on by new
229technology (such as drug-dogs) and changing social norms. Justice
Scalia may contend that Katz is still good law,230 but Jardines makes it
unclear whether he and several other Justices think it is important or ap-
plicable. What is clear is that a potential result of limiting privacy doc-
trine, and of propagating bad law in general, is that courts may simply
avoid addressing rights deemed unworthy of careful diagnosis.23 1
Jardines risks advancing "a rule that is unrepresentative" of how future
cases should be decided, and "distort[s] . . . the nature of [the] con-
,232trovers[y]" concerning Fourth Amendment search analysis.
CONCLUSION
Florida v. Jardines reached the right result but should have taken a
different approach to get there. The Court correctly concluded that the
police engaged in an unlawful search, but the opinion unfortunately re-
lied on property and trespass law instead of Katz's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy standard.233 The majority's specific and unapologetic
dismissal of Katz's critical privacy considerations234 resulted in a failure
to overrule questionable cases, did not create a clear and broadly appli-
cable rule, and perpetuated a standard that allows for an unequal applica-
tion of Fourth Amendment protections. Furthermore, by relegating
Katz's privacy analysis to a secondary position behind a property analy-
226. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
227. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches ... shall not be violated .... ); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
228. See Amar, supra note 207, at 757-58.
229. Id. at 798.
230. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
231. Marceau, supra note 15, at 755.
232. Schauer, supra note 196, at 900, 905.
233. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
234. Id.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
sis, the Court is potentially signaling that privacy rights are of diminished
significance or that their analysis is unnecessary. Although Justice Ka-
gan's concurring opinion reminds us that Katz and privacy rights are as
important as ever and could have easily decided Jardines,235 her opinion
does not set the legal standard.
Jardines' trespass analysis rightly reaffirms the home's unique and
highly protected status and ensures that residents are free from govern-
ment searches that violate property interests.236 However, segregation of
property and privacy doctrine within the realm of the Fourth Amendment
"forecloses consideration of the totality of a police-citizen interaction."
237
Consequently, "the quality of the resultant constitutional rights" is nega-
tively impacted.238 Florida v. Jardines is an example of this phenome-
non. The Fourth Amendment may have originally relied solely on prop-
erty and trespass law, 2 39 but analysis today requires examination of the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard.240 After all, as the Second
Circuit in United States v. Thomas24 1 concluded, "[t]he very fact that a
person is in his own home raises a reasonable inference that he intends to
have privacy."242 The Jardines decision may protect the home from tres-
pass and inappropriate physical intrusions, but it does not include the
necessary analysis required to definitively address and answer Fourth
Amendment privacy concerns. More troubling still, the Jardines decision
does not ensure that the same rights are available to all citizens regard-
less o' the physical or structural nature of their residence.
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